Transaction Costs and the Present Value “Puzzle” of Farmland Prices by de Fontnouvelle, Patrick & Lence, Sergio H
Economics Publications Economics
2002
Transaction Costs and the Present Value “Puzzle” of
Farmland Prices
Patrick de Fontnouvelle
United States Securities and Exchange Commission
Sergio H. Lence
Iowa State University, shlence@iastate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_pubs
Part of the Agricultural Economics Commons, Econometrics Commons, and the Regional
Economics Commons
The complete bibliographic information for this item can be found at http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
econ_las_pubs/35. For information on how to cite this item, please visit http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
howtocite.html.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Economics Publications by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
digirep@iastate.edu.
Transaction Costs and the Present Value “Puzzle” of Farmland Prices
Abstract
The present study introduces a theoretical land pricing model that allows for proportional transaction costs,
and a corresponding kernel regression test. The model is tested with farmland returns data for 20 individual
states, and also with two aggregate U.S. level series. The constant discount rate (CDR) present value model
(PVM) of farmland prices is strongly rejected. However, it is found that the behavior of land prices and rents
is consistent with the CDR-PVM in the presence of empirically observed values of transaction costs. Findings
are very robust in that they apply to both individual state-level data and the U.S. aggregate-level series.
Disciplines
Agricultural Economics | Econometrics | Regional Economics
Comments
This article is from Southern Economic Journal 68 (2002): 549, doi:10.2307/1061717. Posted with permission.
Rights
Works produced by employees of the U.S. Government as part of their official duties are not copyrighted
within the U.S. The content of this document is not copyrighted.
This article is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_pubs/35
  Southern Economic Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Southern Economic 
Journal.
http://www.jstor.org
Transaction Costs and the Present Value "Puzzle" of Farmland Prices 
Author(s): Patrick de Fontnouvelle and Sergio H. Lence 
Source:   Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 68, No. 3 (Jan., 2002), pp. 549-565
Published by:  Southern Economic Association
Stable URL:  http://www.jstor.org/stable/1061717
Accessed: 07-03-2016 20:36 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
 info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content 
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. 
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.188 on Mon, 07 Mar 2016 20:36:08 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.188 on Mon, 07 Mar 2016 20:36:08 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Southern Economic Journal 2002, 68(3), 549-565 
Transaction Costs and the Present Value 
"Puzzle" of Farmland Prices 
Patrick de Fontnouvelle* and Sergio H. Lencet 
The present study introduces a theoretical land pricing model that allows for proportional trans-
action costs, and a corresponding kernel regression test. The model is tested with farmland 
returns data for 20 individual states, and also with two aggregate U.S. level series. The constant 
discount rate (CDR) present value model (PVM) of farmland prices is strongly rejected. How-
ever, it is found that the behavior of land prices and rents is consistent with the CDR-PVM in 
the presence of empirically observed values of transaction costs. Findings are very robust in 
that they apply to both individual state-level data and the U.S. aggregate-level series. 
1. Introduction 
Farmland is by far the dominant asset in the U.S. agricultural sector's balance sheet, ac-
counting for about two-thirds of the value of all farm assets (USDA, various years). The value 
of U.S. farmland was estimated at $593 billion on December 31, 1994, or roughly 10% of total 
market capitalization for firms in the S&P 500. These figures indicate that farmland is an 
important asset for both the agricultural sector and the U.S. economy as a whole. 
Figure 1 shows the behavior of real farmland prices in Iowa between 1900 and 1994. The 
time series begins with a boom in land prices between 1900 and 1916, followed by a downturn 
that lasted until the early 1930s. Prices then rose gradually through the 1950s and 1960s, soared 
in the 1970s, and plummeted once again in the 1980s. Because land has been a major source 
of collateral in agricultural lending, large drops in land values have typically been accompanied 
by substantial reductions in the availability of credit to the sector. The resulting bankruptcies 
have caused large-scale disruption in America's rural economy. In states where agriculture is a 
dominant industry (e.g., Iowa, Kansas), these disruptions have led to major economic crises. 
Because fluctuations in the price of farmland can have such serious consequences, numerous 
studies have attempted to explain the determinants of its value. 1 Most of these studies are based 
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sponding author. 
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(FAO) of the United Nations when this work was finished. The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect 
the views of FAO. This is Journal Paper J-19318 of the Iowa Agriculture and Home Economics Experiment Station, 
Ames, IA, Project 3558, and supported by Hatch Act and State of Iowa funds. 
Received April 1999; accepted March 200 I. 
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Figure 1. Iowa Farmland Prices from 1900 to 1994 
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on a frictionless present value model (PVM). The simplest version of this model, which assumes 
a constant discount rate (CDR), is typically rejected (Falk 1991; Clark, Fulton, and Scott 1993; 
Tegene and Kuchler 1993). This is a "puzzling" result because the CDR-PVM has been widely 
accepted and generally used for land appraisal purposes. Beyond this, however, there is surpris-
ingly little consensus regarding the determinants of farmland prices (Pope et al. 1979; Robison 
and Koenig 1992; Starn 1995). A major reason for this lack of consensus may be the heterogeneity 
of the data sets used for empirical analysis. Different studies use different levels of aggregation, 
different time periods, and different land value and rent series. Hanson and Myers (1995), for 
example, use country-level data, whereas Tegene and Kuchler (1993) use regional data and Just 
and Miranowski (1993) use state-level data. Hanson and Myers (1995) use data from 1910 to 
1990, Shiha and Chavas (1995) use data from 1949 to 1990, and Brown and Brown (1984) use 
data from 1968 to 1981. Falk (1991) examines farmland values and gross cash rents, whereas 
Hanson and Myers (1995) examine farm real estate values and residual returns to farm real estate. 
Another possible explanation for the lack of consensus about farmland pricing, and the 
focus of the present study, is the presence of market frictions. Our motivation for exploring the 
role that market frictions might play in determining farmland prices is both theoretical and 
empirical. On the theoretical level, market frictions drive a wedge between the price at which 
outsiders wish to buy land and that at which farmers wish to sell it. The market price can be 
anywhere within this wedge, and thus can easily deviate from its frictionless present value. One 
can interpret this wedge as a band of inaction LA.L, A_U], inside which farmers neither buy nor 
sell land even in the face of changing expected returns. The band is centered on the price that 
would prevail in the absence of transaction costs, and its width is determined by the size of 
these costs. On the empirical level, a review of the literature reveals that the frictionless market 
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assumption is not a realistic representation of how farmland is actually traded. Although the 
costs associated with trading many financial assets are small, costs incurred in transferring 
ownership of farmland typically exceed 7.5% of the purchase price. 
To explore the role of market frictions, we use the PVM recently used by Lence and Miller 
(1999), which explicitly incorporates proportional transaction costs. This model is closely related 
to those developed in the asset pricing literature (He and Modest 1995), and reduces to the 
standard PVM when transaction costs are zero. This standard PVM requires that returns to 
farmland satisfy a conditional moment equality restriction, which can be tested using a variety 
of well-developed econometric techniques (Hansen and Singleton 1982; Falk 1991). In the 
presence of frictions, however, the PVM implies a conditional moment inequality restriction, 
which corresponds to the band of inaction discussed earlier. 
We use kernel regression techniques to construct a test for conditional moment inequality 
restrictions. Conditional moment inequalities are simply restrictions on a particular conditional 
expectation function, and kernel regression provides a natural way to estimate this function from 
the available data. We then calculate 95% uniform confidence intervals around the kernel es-
timate of the conditional expectation function, and reject the PVM if at least one of the confi-
dence intervals lies entirely outside of the band of inaction [J\L, l\u]. 
Kernel regressions are also attractive because they have an intuitively useful pictorial rep-
resentation: a plot of expected future returns against (standardized) past returns. This plot gives 
a clear picture of whether statistically significant rejections of the frictionless CDR-PVM are 
economically significant. Under the frictionless CDR-PVM, expected returns should be constant. 
If the deviations of the estimated conditional expectations function from constant expected 
returns are small (less than 0.1 %, for example), then the assumption of frictionless markets may 
be economically acceptable. If, on the other hand, the plots indicate consistently predictable 
opportunities for large trading profits, then a rejection of the frictionless PVM would seem 
economically significant. 
To ensure that the results are as general as possible, the test is conducted over a compre-
hensive data set of farmland prices. This data set includes state-level data for all major agri-
cultural states, as well as two different national series. The pictorial representation of the kernel 
regression also allows for a straightforward comparison of results across these different data 
sets: If the same economic forces are responsible for rejection of PVM in different states, then 
the regression functions would have roughly the same shape. We have two main empirical 
findings. First, the frictionless CDR-PVM is strongly rejected for most of the data sets. Second, 
all data sets are consistent with the standard CDR-PVM in the presence of the transaction costs 
typically involved in the transfer of ownership of farm real estate. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the empirical literature 
on transaction costs for U.S. farmland. Section 3 presents a CDR-PVM that incorporates proportional 
transaction costs. Section 4 discusses related models of market frictions. Section 5 describes the 
data used in our analysis. Section 6 introduces a kernel-based test of conditional moment inequality 
restrictions. Section 7 reports and discusses the empirical findings, and section 8 concludes. 
2. Transaction Costs for U.S. Farmland 
This section reviews the empirical literature on transaction costs for U.S. farmland. Survey 
responses in a 1964 U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) study revealed that the most 
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popular method of farmland sale was through brokers, which accounted for 49% of voluntary 
sales. Direct sales and public auctions accounted for 39 and 12% of voluntary sales, respectively. 
The most common sales commission charged was 5% (60% of the time); other typical sales 
commission charges were 6 and 10% (12 and 15% of the time, respectively). 
The USDA study does not report specific figures for transaction costs other than brokerage 
commissions, but it does provide an extensive list of such costs. Title fees (abstract, insurance, 
search, and stamps), surveyor's fees, notary fees, and recording fees are commonly incurred 
during the sale or purchase of agricultural land. When the property itself is used as collateral, 
buyers must also pay appraisal fees, loan agent's fees, document stamp fees on the mortgage, 
and additional recording fees. 
Moyer and Daugherty (1982) calculated that transaction costs other than brokerage com-
missions averaged 2.5% of the purchase price of land in the United States. Their estimate was 
obtained from a nationwide survey conducted by the USDA on land transactions that occurred 
between 1975 and 1977. The figure reported by Moyer and Daugherty is consistent with that 
obtained by Wunderlich (1989) using data from the USDA Survey of Land Transfers. Wunder-
lich reported that transaction costs exclusive of sales commissions averaged 3% of the value of 
land transferred in the United States. According to Wunderlich, a rough approximation of the 
costs involved in the transfer of land ownership is 3 to 10% of the land value for brokerage 
fees, plus 2.5 to 3% of the land value for title insurance, legal fees, appraisals, and surveys. 
He also states that in some markets, total costs can be as high as 15% of the land price. 
Sales that do not involve brokerage services do not incur commission costs, but still carry 
implicit costs because some of the broker services2 must be performed by the transferees at 
their own expense. It is also probable that such transactions may be concluded under less 
favorable terms: Thompson and Whiteside (1987) found that in South Carolina, farmland mar-
keted by real estate firms averaged prices about 10% higher than farmland sold privately. Their 
results suggest that implicit costs in private sales can be as high or higher than explicit brokerage 
costs. 
3. The Model 
Consider the standard PVM of asset pricing (e.g., Sharpe, Alexander, and Bailey 1995, p. 
580) 
(1) 
where pi,t is the real price of asset i at time t, 13i.r is the discount factor corresponding to asset 
i at time t, E,(·) is the expectation operator conditional on information at time t, and di.r is the 
real dividend paid by asset i at timet. Alternately, Equation 1 may be rewritten as the condition 
that the expected gross rate of return equals the required gross rate of return: 
(2) 
where Ri.t+I == (pi,t+I + di.r+ 1)/pi,r The discount factor l3i.l equals the inverse of the required gross 
2 Examples of such services include appraisal, search, advertising, showing the property, and providing land market 
information. 
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rate of return corresponding to asset i. The required rate of return specifically accounts for the 
risk involved in holding asset i, so that ~u incorporates both time and risk considerations. 
Equation 1 is a necessary condition for equilibrium in the market for asset i. If the current 
price of asset i were smaller (greater) than the right -hand side of Equation 1, agents would find 
it attractive to buy (sell) asset i now because doing so would yield an expected return above 
the required return. Such a situation is inconsistent with equilibrium. Equation 1 also nests 
several important asset pricing models. In the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the required 
return depends upon return i's covariance with the market portfolio. In the arbitrage pricing 
theory (APT), the required return depends on the covariance of the asset's return with various 
market-wide factors. In the consumption CAPM, the required return depends on the covariance 
between R; and the agents' intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption. 
Although typically neglected, an important assumption implicit in Equations 1 and 2 is 
that the market for asset i is frictionless. In the presence of market frictions, these restrictions 
may not hold even in equilibrium. If expected returns are greater than (less than) required 
returns, expected returns net of transaction costs may still be less than (greater than) required 
returns. Agents may thus have no incentive to trade even if Equation 2 is violated. 
To model the effects of market frictions, we assume that all transactions are subject to a 
proportional transaction cost. We also assume that the same transaction cost, T;, applies to both 
purchases and sales of asset i. 3 In the presence of such costs, agents buying the asset at time t 
and selling it at time t + 1 face a gross rate of return net of transaction costs equal to 
(1 - T)•n. 1 + d 1 Rbuy = I YI,t+ 1,t+ 
i,t+l - (1 + T;)fJ;,r , 
and those performing the opposite transactions face a gross rate of return net of transaction 
costs equal to 
Rsell 
i,t+l 
(1 + T;)Pi,t+l + di,t+l 
(1 - T;)P;,r 
In equilibrium, it must hold that no agent wishes to either buy or sell asset i, so that E/Rm 1) 
cannot be greater than the required rate of return (1/~i.t) and E/R).~1l 1 ) cannot be less than the 
required rate of return. That is, 
(3) 
Using Equation 3 together with Rf,~~~ 2: (1 - T;)R;,r+ 1/(l + T;) and R).~1l 1 s (1 + T;)R;,1+1/(l -
T;) yields the following equilibrium restriction: 
-2T 2T 
X_L = ---' s ~i,IE,(R;.t+ 1 ) - 1 s --'- = A.f. 
I 1 + T; 1 - T; (4) 
Clearly, Equation 1 is a special case of Equation 4 corresponding to frictionless markets. 
This special case requires agents to react to all new information concerning future dividends, 
3 The assumption that buyers and sellers pay the same transaction costs has the same testable implications as the more 
general assumption that they pay different transaction costs. To prove this point, suppose that buyers pay a transaction 
cost of 7;.b"'' and that sellers pay a different transaction cost of 7'·""' One can derive the moment restriction ( -7,.b"' -
7'·"11 )/(1 + 7;b,,) :s 13,_,E,(R,_,+ 1) - I :s (7;,b"' + 7'·"11 )/(1 - 7'·"") by following the same arguments as in the main text. 
One can then show that for any values of 7;.b"' and 7'·'"'' setting 7; = (7;.b"' + 7;_,o~ 1 )/(2 + 7;.b"' - 7'·'"') reduces this 
restriction to Equation 4. 
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so that price always adjusts to the "fundamental" value given m Equation 5 below. In the 
presence of transaction costs, however, Equation 4 induces a band of inaction [Af", AY]. Inside 
this band, the gains from adjusting one's portfolio in response to new information are more 
than offset by the losses stemming from the transaction costs involved in such adjustment. 
Assuming that 13, is invariant with time, recursive application of Equation 1 yields the 
CDR version of the PVM typically used in the farmland pricing literature (Falk 1991 ): 
Pi.t = L 13;+] E,(di,t+J. (5) 
s-= I 
This CDR-PVM can also be derived from the constant 13 versions of the CAPM and APT, and 
from the consumption CAPM for the case of linear utility. The conditional moment inequality 
restriction corresponding to Equation 5 is similar to Equation 4, but with 13, substituted for 13,,. 
Such an expression is the basis for the empirical test used here to study farmland prices. 
4. Related Work on Market Frictions 
He and Modest (1995) and Luttmer (1996) have previously investigated how market fric-
tions affect the empirical performance of consumption-based asset pricing models. Extending 
techniques developed by Hansen and Jagannathan (1991), these authors use asset return data to 
derive volatility bounds on agents' intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption.4 
The advantage of such techniques over traditional conditional moment tests (Hansen and Sin-
gleton 1982) is that one need not compute the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (which 
requires specifying the agents' utility function) to calculate the volatility bounds. One can thus 
obtain a clear picture of the restrictions implied by the returns data without making any a priori 
behavioral assumptions. The CDR-PVM (Equation 5), however, does not make explicit use of 
the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, so that in this case the volatility bounds technique 
has no clear advantage over direct examination of the conditional moment restriction (Equation 
4).5 
In the land pricing literature, the frictionless assumption has recently been relaxed by Shiha 
and Chavas ( 1995) and Lence and Miller ( 1999).6 Shiha and Chavas extend the CAPM by 
allowing for barriers to external equity capital flows into farm real estate markets, but assume 
zero transaction costs otherwise. Lence and Miller ( 1999) develop a bootstrap method to test 
models allowing for nonzero costs of transferring farmland ownership. They apply their test to 
a long time series of farmland values and rents for Iowa, arguably the most traditional agricul-
tural state in the United States. Lence and Miller find Iowa farmland prices consistent (incon-
4 The intertemporal marginal rate of substitution is defined as ou'(c,. 1 )/u'(c,), where o denotes an agent's rate of time 
preference and u'(c,) denotes her marginal utility of consumption in period t. 
'The present study uses the CDR version of the PVM because there is no readily available consumption data for farm 
households. Obtaining such data remains an important endeavor for future research. With such data, a test based on 
volatility bounds and an extension of the methods proposed in this paper would both be feasible empirical projects to 
pursue. We argue in the conclusion, however. that such extensions are unlikely to alter the basic implications of the 
present results. 
''Just and Miranowski ( 1993) and Chavas and Thomas ( 1999) have also examined farmland prices in the presence of 
transaction costs. However. the derivation and estimation of their models are subject to several difficulties, both practical 
and technical. that are discussed at length in Lence (2001 ). 
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sistent) with the CDR-PVM in the presence of typical transaction costs assuming a one-period 
(an infinite-period) holding horizon. 
The present study differs from Lence and Miller in two fundamental ways. First, the 
empirical method developed here relies on kernel regression rather than bootstrapping. A clear 
advantage of the former method over the latter in the present context is that kernel regression 
allows us to fit potential nonlinearities implied by the band of inaction.7 Second, unlike Lence 
and Miller, who only use data for a single U.S. state, the present analysis is based upon a much 
larger data set consisting of state-level series for as many as twenty U.S. states, plus two 
alternative country-level series and the Iowa series used by Lence and Miller. To our knowledge, 
no single farmland valuation study has analyzed as many series as the present one. The obvious 
advantage of relying on such a comprehensive data set is that results are much less likely to 
depend on the particular series chosen for analysis. 
5. Data 
As discussed earlier, previous studies have used different data sets and periods of analysis. 
To verify the robustness of our results, the model is tested against most available data sets used 
in the existing literature. In all instances, we follow Falk (1991) in setting j3,_ 1 constant and 
equal to the inverse of the sample mean of R,_,. In general, this choice will be the most favorable 
to accepting the CDR-PVM, for it guarantees that at least the unconditional version of Equation 
2 is satisfied. The resulting CDRs are reported in the column headed j3, of Table I. 
State-Level Farmland Prices and Gross Cash Rents 
These two series (used for Pu and d,.~, respectively) are prepared by the USDA and are 
partly unpublished;8 details about their construction can be found in Barnard and Hexem (1988). 
The series are deflated using the All Items Consumer Price Index from Economic Indicators 
(Council of Economic Advisers, various years) and from U.S. Department of Commerce (1976). 
There are 26 states with no missing observations for the period 1921-1990. However, the model 
is estimated for only 20 states because data for the other six states seem unreliable.9 The issue 
of data reliability is discussed in more detail in the Appendix. The analysis in the Appendix 
also shows that the quality of the data is somewhat questionable even for many of the 20 fitted 
states; the results for these states should thus be interpreted with caution. 
7 For example, in equilibrium expected returns cannot depend linearly on past returns through the whole space of past 
returns (e.g .. see Figure 2a-d). This is true because equilibrium precludes expected returns from depending on past 
returns outside the band of inaction. even though inside the band expected returns may depend linearly on past returns. 
In contrast, Lence and Miller fit the best (linear) ARIMA model to the return series, and then use the corresponding 
residuals to perform the bootstrap. Hence, their method assumes a linear dependence of expected returns on past returns. 
8 The kind assistance of John Jones at the USDA in providing the data set and related information is gratefully acknowl-
edged. 
"The 20 states for which the model is estimated are. in order of perceived data reliability, Iowa. Illinois, Minnesota, 
Indiana, Ohio, Missouri, South Dakota, Wisconsin, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Georgia, South Carolina, Mississippi, 
Arkansas, Michigan, Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, and Maryland. Except for Maryland. for which the 
series cover the period 1921-1991, data for all of the fitted states span the period 1921-1994. The six states with 
unreliable data are New Jersey, Maine, Delaware, Vermont, Massachusetts, and Connecticut. 
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Table 1. Results for Selected States and Aggregate U.S. Data 
p-values 
Discount Bandwidth 
Series T, = 0 T, = 1.5% T, = 5% (13,) (b,) Period 
Iowa 0.01 0.59 0.93 0.5 1921-1994 
Illinois O.oi 0.35 0.93 0.4 1921-1994 
Minnesota 0.00 0.01 0.38 0.92 0.3 1921-1994 
Indiana 0.00 0.74 0.93 0.4 1921-1994 
Ohio 0.06 0.94 0.8 1921-1994 
Missouri 0.00 0.06 0.94 0.4 1921-1994 
South Dakota 0.00 0.01 0.77 0.92 0.3 1921-1994 
Wisconsin 0.00 0.40 0.93 0.4 1921-1994 
North Dakota 0.00 0.18 0.93 0.4 1921-1994 
Pennsylvania 0.42 0.94 1.1 1921-1994 
Georgia 0.00 0.40 0.90 0.4 1921-1994 
South Carolina 0.00 0.15 0.92 0.4 1921-1994 
Mississippi 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.92 0.3 1921-1994 
Arkansas 0.00 0.89 0.7 1921-1994 
Michigan 0.00 0.93 0.5 1921-1994 
Tennessee 0.00 0.33 0.90 0.5 1921-1994 
Virginia 0.26 0.92 0.8 1921-1994 
North Carolina 0.00 0.25 0.90 0.5 1921-1994 
Kentucky 0.00 0.65 0.90 0.4 1921-1994 
Maryland 0.08 0.93 0.8 1921-1991 
Iowa" 0.00 0.27 0.94 0.2 1900-1994 
U.S. farm real est. 0.02 0.98 0.91 0.5 1910-1994 
U.S. farm assets 0.27 0.96 0.4 1910-1986 
"-"indicates that both of the point estimates mh (-1) and liz" (I) lie inside the intervali;\L, ;\u]. 
'These are the Iowa data from Lence and Miller ( 1999). 
Iowa Data Used by Lence and Miller 
The Iowa data used by Lence and Miller (1999) are unique, because Iowa is the only state 
for which annual farmland price and rent data are available as far back as 1900. These data are 
of interest because they span two price cycles: Iowa farmland prices exhibited one price cycle 
that peaked in 1916, and another that peaked in 1980 (see Figure 1). For this reason, and to 
facilitate comparison with the findings from Lence and Miller, their data were also used to 
perform the kernel regression tests. These data are analogous to the other state-level data de-
scribed above, but span the period 1900-1994 (instead of 1921-1994), and cash rents are net 
of property taxes. Further datails can be found in Lence and Miller (1999, p. 264). 
U.S. Farm Real Estate Value and Income from Farm Real Estate 
We examine these two series because they provide reasonable measures of farmland prices 
and dividends, respectively, and because they replicate very closely the data used previously 
by Hanson and Myers (1995). The income from farm real estate (IFRE) series is obtained as 
follows: 
where GFI is gross farm income, GRV is the gross rental value of operator and other dwellings, 
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TPE denotes total production expenses, I denotes interest, NR is the net rent to nonoperator 
landlords, CC is the capital consumption of operator and other dwellings, and RET A is the ratio 
of farm real estate value to total farm assets. 10 The correction for operator and other dwellings 
is made because such dwellings are not included in the farm real estate asset values and the 
total farm assets series. The series are reported in Johnson (1990) and in Economic Indicators 
of the Farm Sector: National Financial Summary (USDA, various years), and span the period 
1910-1994. 11 Both farm real estate values and income from farm real estate are deflated using 
the All Items Consumer Price Index from Economic Indicators (Council of Economic Advisers, 
Various Years) and from U.S. Department of Commerce (1976). 
U.S. Total Farm Assets and Net Returns to Farm Assets 
These two series are reported in Melichar (1987); they span the period 1910-1986, and 
are already expressed in real terms using the implicit price deflator for personal consumption 
expenditures. These series have been used extensively in studies of farm real estate prices 
(Melichar 1979; Phipps 1984; Featherstone and Baker 1987; Clark, Fulton, and Scott 1993). 
The ratio R;,,+ 1 = (pi,t+ 1 + d;_,+ 1 )lp;,, is obtained as the ratio of net returns to farm assets to 
initial total farm assets, plus one. 
6. Empirical Methods 
We consider each returns series separately. This enables us to simplify notation by dropping 
the i subscript. In the absence of market frictions, A L and Au are both zero. The equilibrium 
restriction Equation 4 reduces to Equation 2, which requires the time t expected value of R,+ 1 
to equal the required return 1113,. This is a "no unused information" restriction: Nothing known 
in one period can help predict the next period's excess returns. Setting H,+ 1 = 13,R,+ 1 - 1, one 
can rewrite this restriction as follows: 
(6) 
To test Equation 6, Hansen and Singleton (1982) let Z, denote an instrument whose value is 
known to agents at time t. Because Equation 6 implies that such an instrument cannot help 
predict H,+ 1, it follows that E[Ht+ 1Z,] = 0. This unconditional moment restriction is the basis 
of Hansen and Singleton's empirical approach. 
In the presence of frictions, the equilibrium restriction takes the form of the conditional 
moment inequality restriction Equation 4 instead of the equality restriction Equation 6. By the 
law of iterated expectations, Equation 4 implies: 
AL :S m(z) :S Au for all z E ffi, 
where m(z) = E(Ht+ 1 I Z, = z). We set the instrument Z, = [R, 
standardized time t return on farmland. 12 
(7) 
E(R,)]~ to be the 
10 RETA is calculated using simple averages of beginning and ending period values for farm real estate and total farm 
assets. 
11 For the years 1910-1939, the farm real estate value series was obtained from Melichar ( 1987). 
12 In principle, Z, could be vector-valued. We include only one lag of returns in Z, because all of our data sets consist of 
less than 100 observations, and kernel estimation is subject to the well-known curse of dimensionality (Hardie 1990, 
p. 257). 
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To test Equation 7, we require a sample analog of m(z), that is, a way to estimate this 
function from the available data. Such an analog is provided by the Nadaraya-Watson kernel 
estimator, which is given by: 
T 
~ K[(z - Z1)1b]H,+t 
mh(z) = :...'~..:..lc;;T------- (8) 
~ K[(z - Z,)lb] 
t=I 
where K(·) is the standard normal density function, and b > 0 is a bandwidth parameter that 
regulates how much the kernel estimator mh(z) smoothes the observed data. This nonparametric 
estimator has particular appeal in the current context. In the absence of transaction costs, m(·) 
has a simple linear parametrization. This is because 'A_L = x_u = 0 implies that m(-) must be 
uniformly equal to zero. In the presence of transaction costs, however, theory provides no 
guidance concerning a parametrization for m(-). All one can be sure of is that a linear param-
etrization would not allow m(z) to vary with z without leaving the band of inaction for large 
(or small) values of z. 
We use the cross-validation procedure described in Hardie (1990) to choose the bandwidth 
parameter b. 13 Under standard regularity assumptions (Bierens 1987; Hardie 1990; Robinson 
1983) concerning the joint distribution of the returns R, and instruments Z,, the Nadaraya-Watson 
estimator (Equation 8) evaluated at k different points converges in distribution to a multivariate 
normal random vector: 
(9) 
where f(z) denotes the marginal density of Z,, a 2 (z) denotes the conditional variance of Hr+t 
given Z1, and cK "" j K 2(u) du is a kernel constant. We then use Equation 9, together with the 
Bonferroni method (Hardie 1990, p. 119), to calculate 95% uniform confidence intervals at the 
points z1 = 1 and z1 = -1. The CDR-PVM will be rejected whenever one (or both) of these 
confidence intervals fails to overlap the band of inaction given by [X. L, X. u]. 
7. Results and Discussion 
Figure 2a presents pictorial results for the Iowa data used in Lence and Miller (1999), 
which is the longest available data series. Figures 2b and 2c present results for Illinois and 
Minnesota, two of the states with the highest quality price and rent data (see section 5). These 
figures plot estimated expected returns mh(z) for values of normalized returns z between -2 and 
2. Two uniform 95% confidence intervals are plotted at the points z = -1 and z = 1. Horizontal 
lines are drawn at 'A_L = -0.0296 and x_u = 0.0305; these bounds correspond to the band of 
inaction induced by T; = 1.5% proportional transactions costs that must be paid both on purchase 
u Bandwidth selection is subject to a trade-off between bias (E[mh(z)] - m(z)) and variance (Var[mh(z)]). If h is large, 
then mh(Z) will be fairly smooth; variance will be small, but bias will be large. Conversely, if b is small, bias will be 
small but variance will be large. Hardie and Vieu ( 1991) show that cross-validation is asymptotically optimal under 
standard regularity assumptions. For an example of how bandwidth selection affects kernel regression estimation in-
volving financial data, refer to Figure 2 in Lo, Mamaysky. and Wang (2000). 
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and sale of farmland. This implies total transaction costs of 3%-a likely lower bound given 
the empirical literature discussed in section 2. 14 The figures also plot the individual data points 
in {ZI' Hr+t} space. Figure 2d presents similar pictorial results for the U.S. farm real estate 
series. 
All four figures (2a-d) indicate that the frictionless CDR-PVM is rejected. The reason for 
this rejection is the same in each case: The upward-sloping regression curve indicates predict-
ability in the gross rate of return series. In the absence of transaction costs, farmers could use 
this predictability to make profits as follows: If R1 is high, purchase additional land at time t 
and sell it at time t + l. Theory implies that positive transaction costs should reduce farmers' 
ability to earn profits by trading land in this manner. This is exactly what we find empirically: 
For 3% transaction costs (T, = 1.5%), the CDR-PVM is rejected only for Minnesota. For more 
realistic transaction costs of 6% (T, = 3%), all four series are consistent with the CDR-PVM. 
Empirical results for all reliable data sets are summarized in a different form in Table I. 
The p values reported in this table correspond to the maximum significance level at which 
restriction Equation 4 cannot be rejected for three different levels of transaction costs: 0, 3, 
and 6% (T, = 0%, T; = 1.5%, and T; = 3%, respectively). In Illinois, for example, the fric-
tionless CDR-PVM cannot be rejected at the 1% significance level: One of the two 99% 
uniform confidence intervals at z = -1 and z = I exactly touches the dotted line correspond-
ing to E[H1+ 1 1Zr = z] = 0, whereas the other confidence interval either exactly touches or 
contains the E[H1+ 1 1 Z1 = z] = 0 dotted line. 
The p values in the T; = 0 column indicate that the frictionless CDR-PVM is strongly 
rejected for a majority of states and for the U.S. farm real estate series, whereas land values 
for Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Maryland, and U.S. farm assets behave in a manner consistent 
with the frictionless CDR-PVM. 15 This fairly broad rejection of the CDR-PVM is in agreement 
with the findings of the previous land value literature (Falk 1991; Clark, Fulton, and Scott 1993; 
Tegene and Kuchler 1993). It should be noted that although the frictionless CDR-PVM is 
rejected for the U.S. farm real estate data, it cannot be rejected for the U.S. farm assets data. 
This suggests that returns on other assets included in the latter data set (e.g., inventories and 
machinery) have different statistical properties than returns to land alone. Mixing the two sets 
of returns (on land and on non! and assets) might be obscuring interesting features in each series. 
Values in the T; = 1.5% column reveal that at the 5% significance level there are only 
three series (Minnesota, South Dakota, and Mississippi) of the 23 analyzed for which land 
values seem to behave at odds with restriction Equation 4. This restriction cannot be rejected 
for any of the 23 series at the 5% significance level if transaction costs are assumed to be in 
the low-to-average range (T; = 3% column). 
Results for the two Iowa series are very similar: The frictionless CDR-PVM is rejected 
for both series, but both are consistent with Equation 4 at the usual levels of significance if T; 
= 1.5%. This finding is reassuring, for it suggests that neither adding more observations (if 
14 Such low costs could be attained by assuming zero brokerage fees and typical nonbrokerage (e.g., legal) costs. 
15 Nonrejection of the frictionless CDR-PVM for the four Northeastern states in the data set seems to be the only 
geographic pattern displayed by the figures reported in Table I. The same is true of the graphs depicting expected 
returns. It must be noted, however, that a formal spatial analysis was not conducted because it was beyond the scope 
of the present work. Readers are referred to Benirschka and Binkley (1994) for a study of differential spatial effects 
in U.S. farmland prices during boom and bust periods. 
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Figure 2. Pictorial Results for (a) Iowa, (b) lllinois, (c) Minnesota, and (d) U.S. Farm Real Estate 
they were available) to the other state-level data nor accounting for real estate taxes are likely 
to reverse the results reported in Table 1. 
The empirical results can be summarized as follows. First, the frictionless CDR-PVM is 
broadly rejected by land value data. Second, the CDR-PVM is consistent with the behavior of 
land values and rents in the presence of typical transaction costs. Third, both of the preceding 
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findings are very robust in that they apply to individual state-level data as well as to U.S. 
aggregate-level data. This result is important because the basic sources used to calculate both 
data series are entirely different, that is, U.S. aggregate data are not averages of the state-level 
data used here. 
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8. Concluding Remarks 
The importance of farmland for the financial health of the U.S. agricultural industry cou-
pled with the observed boom-bust cycles in farmland prices has historically caused concern to 
both the farm sector and related sectors such as banking. Researchers have responded to such 
concerns by devoting many resources to exploring and understanding the behavior of land prices. 
The literature, however, has devoted little attention to the implications for farmland price be-
havior of the large costs typically involved in transfers of farmland ownership. 
The present study introduces a kernel-based procedure that allows us to test the CDR-
PVM in the presence of transaction costs. The model is tested with data corresponding to 20 
individual states, and also with two aggregate U.S.-level series. Our findings are consistent with 
recent land value studies, in that the frictionless CDR-PVM of farmland prices is strongly 
rejected. However, it is found that the behavior of land values and rents is consistent with the 
CDR-PVM in the presence of typical transaction costs. The present results are important for 
two reasons. First, they confirm the seminal findings of Lence and Miller (1999) by means of 
a completely different testing strategy. Second, these results are quite robust, because they rely 
upon a much more comprehensive data set than previously used by any single farmland valu-
ation study. 
Our results suggest that, in the context of the CDR-PVM, there is nothing inherently 
"wrong" with the behavior of land prices. Although land markets may be considered inefficient 
because frictions prevent agents from reflecting in land prices all of the information available 
to them, it is unclear what policy could reduce such frictions. Whether it would even be a good 
idea to do so is an open question: Tobin (1974, 1978) has suggested that transaction costs might 
actually reduce price volatility in securities markets. We stress that our results in no way explain 
what actually causes the large swings observed in farmland prices. But they do suggest that 
this is an important area for future research, one that may have policy implications for farmland 
markets. 
We have found that land price data are consistent even with the most naive version of the 
PVM once typical transaction costs are accounted for. Because transaction costs are so large in 
farmland markets, any reasonable modification (such as using consumption or interest rate data 
to specify a time-varying discount factor) of the CDR-PVM should imply partial equilibrium 
restrictions on returns that also are consistent with the data. It thus seems likely that such 
modifications will not yield empirically falsifiable restrictions on the time series behavior of 
land prices, 16 and that further pursuit of this line of research may be of limited interest. 
We believe that future research should instead investigate structural models aimed at ex-
plaining the root causes of swings in farmland prices. For example, Rosen, Murphy, and 
Scheinkman ( 1994) present a rational expectations model of how small exogenous shocks in 
demand and production can induce large cyclical fluctuations in the cattle market. Given the 
qualitative similarity of such fluctuations with swings in farmland prices, it seems possible that 
similar mechanisms might drive land price dynamics. However, they do not consider the "band 
of inaction" induced by transaction costs, which we have found to have such strong effects on 
land price dynamics. Whether land price behavior can be explained by structural models in-
corporating rational expectations, or transaction costs, or both, thus remains an important open 
16 This situation is in marked contrast to that in other asset markets, where frictions are much smaller and the empirical 
performance of asset pricing models is much less clear (He and Modest 1995; Luttmer 1996). 
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research question. If one can account for observed swings in farmland prices as rational reactions 
to exogenous events, then it would seem of little consequence that transaction costs prevent 
prices from reacting immediately. In contrast, if fluctuations in farmland prices cannot be ac-
counted for in such a manner-if they result instead from some deeper market inefficiency-
then there may be a need for corrective policy action. 
Appendix: Reliability of State-Level Data 
There are two available data sets containing state-level farmland prices. The first is constructed by the USDA from 
surveys in which respondents indicate gross cash rents and values of the corresponding cash-rented farm real estate. We 
refer to this as the cash-rented (CR) data set. The USDA also publishes a second data set, containing state-level series 
of farm real estate values that reflect the value of all (not only cash-rented) farm real estate. We refer to this as the all-
farm (AF) data set. The CR and AF data are obtained from entirely different surveys (Barnard and Hexem 1988). 
In this paper, we use prices from the AF data set and rents from the CR data set. The motivation for doing so is 
that CR farm real estate values are likely to move closely with the value of AF real estate, and the construction of the 
AF real estate value series implies that such a series is of better quality than the series on CR farm real estate values 
(Barnard and Hexem 1988). For example, for Vermont there are 8 (13) instances in which either an annual drop greater 
than 25% in CR farm real estate value (gross cash rent) is followed immediately by an annual increase exceeding 25%, 
or vice versa. We suspect that sampling error in the CR series is responsible for such behavior, which is not surprising 
because the CR data are based on a much smaller sample than the AF data. 
Appendix AI 
Estimates of Regression (I 0) for Selected States 
Point Estimates Std. Deviations 
Series <Pn <l>t <Po <Pt R' n(obs) 
Iowa -0.001 0.97 0.004 0.04 0.89 73 
Illinois -0.001 1.04 0.005 0.06 0.81 73 
Minnesota -0.003 0.97 0.005 0.06 0.78 73 
Indiana -0.004 1.05 0.005 0.07 0.76 73 
Ohio -0.003 0.93 0.006 0.09 0.61 73 
Missouri -0.007 0.94 0.050 0.09 0.61 73 
South Dakota -0.003 0.99 0.011 0.14 0.40 73 
Wisconsin -0.008 0.84 0.007 0.12 0.40 73 
North Dakota -0.006 0.96 0.011 0.15 0.38 73 
Pennsylvania 0.001 0.91 0.009 0.15 0.33 73 
Georgia 0.002 0.78 0.010 0.15 0.27 73 
South Carolina -0.004 0.83 0.013 0.17 0.26 73 
Mississippi -0.000 0.67 0.009 0.14 0.25 73 
Arkansas -0.002 0.62 0.009 0.13 0.24 73 
Michigan -0.006 0.85 0.011 0.19 0.22 73 
Tennessee -0.006 0.82 0.012 0.22 0.17 73 
Virginia -0.005 0.95 0.015 0.25 0.16 73 
North Carolina -0.002 0.68 0.012 0.19 0.15 73 
Kentucky -0.005 0.83 0.014 0.25 0.14 73 
Maryland -0.010 0.89 0.150 0.33 0.10 70 
New Jersey 0.027 -0.06 0.027 0.06 0.01 72 
Maine -0.001 0.51 0.039 0.73 0.01 73 
Delaware 0.013 0.39 0.046 0.78 0.00 73 
Vermont 0.004 0.22 0.038 0.71 0.00 73 
Massachusetts 0.040 -0.03 0.054 0.16 0.00 69 
Connecticut 0.043 0.02 0.041 0.09 0.00 69 
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Given the importance of data quality for the study's purposes, a simple quantitative procedure is used to assess 
data quality for individual states. More specifically, the quality of the data on CR farm real estate is assessed by means 
of the regression 
(AI) 
where y, is the real value of CR farm real estate at time t, x, is the real value of AF real estate at timet, and e,. 1 is an 
error term. Natural logarithms of value changes are used in Equation AI following the recommendations of Tornqvist, 
Vartia, and Vartia (1985). Real values are obtained by deflating nominal values using the All-Items Consumer Price Index. 
The previous discussion suggests that, unless there are unreasonably large sample errors in the CR series, fitting 
Equation AI should yield an estimate of ¢> 0 (<J, 0 ) not significantly different from zero, an estimate of ¢> 1 (<J, 1) not signif-
icantly different from one, and an R 2 close to one. 
Results from regression Equation 10 for all 26 states that had no missing observations for the CR farm real estate 
value series in the period 1921 through 1990 are summarized in Table AI. States are reported in decreasing order of 
their respective R'. There are three interesting findings. First, <l>n is not significantly different from zero for any state. 
Second and more important, there are five states for which <J, 1 is closer to zero than to one. Additional calculations 
indicate that none of these is significantly different from zero. Third, there are only six states for which R 2 exceeds 50%. 
Given these results, it is clear that series with <J, 1 not significantly different from zero can be considered too unreliable 
to pursue any further analysis. In addition, series with <J, 1 near one but with low R2 (e.g., R2 < 0.25) seem of questionable 
quality and should therefore be used and analyzed with care. 
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